In this paper an adaptive decision model based on predictive loops through feeling states is analysed from the perspective of rationality. Four different variations of Hebbian learning are considered for different types of connections in the decision model. To assess the extent of rationality, a measure is introduced reflecting the environment's behaviour. Simulation results and the extents of rationality of the different models over time are presented and analysed.
Introduction
In decision making tasks different options are compared in order to make a reasonable choice out of them. Options usually have emotional responses associated to them relating to a prediction of a rewarding or aversive consequence. In decisions such an emotional valuing often plays an important role. In recent neurological literature this has been related to a notion of value as represented in the amygdala [1, 2, 14, 15, 17] . In making decisions experiences with the environment (from the past) play an important role. By learning processes the decision making mechanism is adapted to these experiences, so that the decision choices made are reasonable or in some way rational, given the enviroment reflected in these past experiences. In this sense the emotion-related valuing in the amygdala as a basis for decision making may be expected to satisfy some rationality criterion. The question to which extent this indeed is the case for certain biologically plausible learning models is the focus of this paper.
The decision model considered involves predictive as-if body loops through feeling states in order to reach decisions for selections of actions (e.g., [3, 6, 8] ). The type of learning considered is Hebbian learning (cf. [10, 12] ), in four different variations by applying it to different types of connections in the decision model. To assess their extent of rationality, a rationality measure is introduced reflecting the environment's behaviour.
In this paper, in Section 2 the decision model and the different variants of adaptivity considered are introduced. Section 3 presents a number of simulation results. In Section 4 measures for rationality are discussed, and the different models are evaluated. Finally, Section 5 is a discussion.
Traditionally an important function attributed to the amygdala concerns the context of fear. However, in recent years much evidence on the amygdala in humans has been collected showing a function beyond this fear context. In humans many parts of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and other brain areas such as hippocampus, basal ganglia, and hypothalamus have extensive, often bidirectional connections with the amygdala [11, 15, 18] . A role of amygdala activation has been found in various tasks involving emotional aspects [16] . Usually emotional responses are triggered by stimuli for which a prediction is possible of a rewarding or aversive consequence. Feeling these emotions represents a way of experiencing the value of such a prediction: to which extent it is positive or negative. This idea of value is also the basis of work on the neural basis of economic choice in neuroeconomics. In particular, in decision-making tasks where different options are compared, choices have been related to a notion of value as represented in the amygdala [1, 2, 14, 15, 17, 19] .
Any mental state in a person induces emotions felt by this person, as described in [7, 8, 9] ; e.g., [9] , p. 93: '… few if any exceptions of any object or event, actually present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in emotional terms. Through either innate design or by learning, we react to most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, however weak, and subsequent feelings, however feeble.' More specifically, in this paper it is assumed that responses in relation to a sensory representation state roughly proceed according to the following causal chain for a body loop (based on elements from [4, 7, 8] ): sensory representation  preparation for bodily response  body state modification  sensing body state  sensory representation of body state  induced feeling
In addition, an as-if body loop uses a direct causal relation preparation for bodily response  sensory representation of body state as a shortcut in the causal chain; cf. [7] . This can be considered a prediction of the action effect by internal simulation (e.g., [13] ). The resulting induced feeling is a valuation of this prediction. If the level of the feeling (which is assumed positive) is high, a positive valuation is obtained.
The body loop (or as-if body loop) is extended to a recursive (as-if) body loop by assuming that the preparation of the bodily response is also affected by the level of the induced feeling: induced feeling  preparation for the bodily response Such recursion is suggested in [8] , pp. 91-92, noticing that what is felt is a body state which is under control of the person: 'The brain has a direct means to respond to the object as feelings unfold because the object at the origin is inside the body, rather than external to it. The brain can act directly on the very object it perceives. (…) The object at the origin on the one hand, and the brain map of that object on the other, can influence each other in a sort of reverberative process that is not to be found, for example, in the perception of an external object.' In this way the valuation of the prediction affects the preparation. A high valuation will strengthen activation of the preparation.
Informally described theories in scientific disciplines, for example, in biological or neurological contexts, often are formulated in terms of causal relationships or in terms of dynamical systems. To adequately formalise such a theory the hybrid dynamic modelling language LEADSTO has been developed that subsumes qualitative and quantitative causal relationships, and dynamical systems; cf. [4] . This language has been proven successful in a number of contexts, varying from biochemical processes that make up the dynamics of cell behaviour to neurological and cognitive processes; e.g. [4, 5] . Within LEADSTO a dynamic property or temporal relation a   D b denotes that when a state property a occurs, then after a certain time delay (which for each relation instance can be specified as any positive real number D), state property b will occur. Below, this D is the time step t. A dedicated software environment is available to support specification and simulation. A specification of the model in LEADSTO format can be found in Appendix A.
An overview of the basic decision model involving the generation of emotional responses and feelings is depicted in Fig. 1 . This picture also shows representations from the detailed specifications explained below. However, note that the precise numerical relations are not expressed in this picture, but in the detailed specifications below, through local properties LP0 to LP6. From the sensor state, sensory representation is updated by dynamic property LP1.
LP1 Generating a sensory representation for a sensed world state
If the sensor state for world state property w has level V1, and the sensory representation for w has level V2 then the sensory representation for w will have level
The combination function h to combine two inputs which activate a subsequent state uses the threshold function th thus keeping the resultant value in the range [0, 1] :
where σ is the steepness and τ is the threshold value. The combination function is:
where V 1 and V 2 are the current activation level of the states and ω 1 and ω 2 are the connection strength of the links from these states.
Dynamic property LP2 describes the update of the preparation state for b i from the sensory representation of w and feeling of b i .
LP2 From sensory representation and feeling to preparation of a body state
If a sensory representation for w with level V occurs and the feeling associated with body state bi has level Vi and the preparation state for bi has level Ui and 1i is the strength of the connection from sensory representation for w to preparation for bi and 2i is the strength of the connection from feeling of bi to preparation for bi and σi is the steepness value for preparation of bi and τi is the threshold value for preparation of bi and 1 is the person's flexibility for bodily responses then after t the preparation state for body state bi will have level Ui
Dynamic property LP3 describes the update of the sensory representation of a body state from the respective preparation state and sensor state.
LP3 From preparation and sensor state to sensory representation of a body state
If preparation state for bi has level Xi and sensor state for bi has level Vi and the sensory representation for body state bi has level Ui and 3i is the strength of the connection from preparation state for bi to sensory representation for bi and σi is the steepness value for sensory representation of bi and τi is the threshold value for sensory representation of bi and 2 is the person's flexibility for bodily responses then after t the sensory representation for bi will have level Ui
Dynamic property LP4 describes update of feeling b i from the sensory representation.
LP4 From sensory representation of a body state to feeling
If the sensory representation for body state bi has level V1, and bi is felt with level V2 then bi will be felt with level
LP5 describes how the effector state for b i is updated from the preparation state. For the considered case study it was assumed that three options are available to the agent and the objective is to see how rationally an agent makes its decisions using a given adaptive model: under constant as well as in stochastic world characteristics and in both cases static as well as changing worlds. The dynamic properties LP7 to LP9 describe a Hebbian learning mechanism for the connection strengths and the sensory representation for w has level V and the preparation of bi has level Vi and the learning rate from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi is  and the extinction rate from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi is  then after t the connection from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi will have
LP5 From preparation to effector state
strength 1i + (VVi (1 -1i) -1i) t.  = srs(w)preparation(bi) (1 -1i) -1i
LP8 Hebbian learning (B): connection from feeling b i to preparation of b i
If the connection from feeling associated with body state bi to preparation of bi has strength 2i and the feeling for bi has level Vi and the preparation of bi has level Ui and the learning rate from feeling of bi to preparation of bi is  and the extinction rate from feeling of bi to preparation of bi is  then after t the connection from feeling of bi to preparation of bi will have
LP9 Hebbian learning (C): connection from preparation of b i to sensory representation of b i
If the connection from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi has strength 3i and the preparation of bi has level Vi and the sensory representation of bi has level Ui and the learning rate from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi is  and the extinction rate from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi is  then after t the connection from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi will have
Simulation Results
In this section some of the simulation results, performed using numerical software, are described in detail. The simulation results address different scenarios reflecting different types of world characteristics, from constant to stochastic world, and from static to changing world. Moreover, learning the connections was done one at a time (A), (B), (C), and learning multiple connections simultaneously (ABC). Due to space limitation the graphs for only (A) are shown here. A summary of the results is given in Table 1 . Results for the rationality factors are presented in the next section. For all simulation results shown, time is on the horizontal axis whereas the vertical axis shows the activation level of the different states.
Step size for all simulations is ∆t = 1. Moreover it depicts the situation in which only one type of links (ω 1i ) is learned as specified in LP7 using the Hebbian approach (A) for the connection from sensory representation of w to preparation state for b i . It is shown that the model adapts the connection strengths of the links ω 1i according to the world characteristics given by λ i . So ω 11 strengthens more and more over time, resulting in the higher activation level of the effector state for b 1 compared to the activation level of the effector states for the other two options b 2 and b 3 . Similar experiments were carried out for a stochastic world with four different cases as mentioned earlier. To simulate the stochastic world, probability distribution functions (PDF) were defined for λ i according to a Normal Distribution. Using these PDFs, the random numbers were generated for λ i limiting the values for the interval [0, 1] with μ 1 =0.9, μ 2 =0.2 and μ 3 =0.1 for λ i respectively. Furthermore the standard deviation for all λ i was taken 0.1. Fig. 3 shows the world state w and stochastic world characteristics λ i . Fig. 4 shows the simulation results while learning is performed for the links (A) from sensory representation of w to preparation state for b i . It can be seen from these results that also in a stochastic scenario the agent model successfully learnt the connections and adapted to the world characteristics rationally with results quite similar to the results for a static world. Another scenario was explored in which the (stochastic) world characteristics were changing drastically from μ 1 =0.9, μ 2 =0.2 and μ 3 =0.1 for λ i respectively to μ 1 =0.1, μ 2 =0.2 and μ 3 =0.9 for λ i respectively with standard deviation of 0.1 for all. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the results for such a scenario. The results show that the agent has successfully adapted to the changing world characteristics over time. The initial settings in this experiment were taken from the previous simulation results shown in Figs. 3 and 4 to keep the continuity of the experiment. It can be observed that the connection strength for option 3 becomes higher compared to the other options, and consequently the value of the effector state for b 3 becomes higher than for the other two by the end of experiment. 
Evaluating Agent Models on Rationality
In the previous section it was shown that the agent model behaves rationally in different scenarios. These scenarios and its different cases are elaborated in detail in the previous section, but the results were assessed with respect to their rationality in a qualitative and rather informal manner. For example, no attempt was made to assign an extent or level to the rationality observed during these experiments. The current section addresses this and to this end two different formally defined measures to assess the extent of the rationality are introduced; one rationality measure is based on a discrete scale and the other one on a continuous scale.
Method 1 (Discrete Rationality Measure)
The first method presented is based on the following point of departure: an agent which has the same respective order of effector state activation levels for the different options compared to the order of world characteristics λ i will be considered highly rational. So in this method the rank of the average value λ i at any given time unit is determined, and compared with the rank of the respective effector state levels. More specifically, the following formula is used to determine the irrationality factor IF.
where n is the number of options available. This irrationality factor tells to which extent the agent is behaving rationally in the sense that the higher the irrationality factor IF is, the lower is the rationality of the agent. It is assumed that the there is uniqueness in ranking and none of the two values assign a similar rank. To calculate the discrete rationality factor DRF, the maximum possible irrationality factor Max. IF can be determined as follows.
Max. IF =
Here ceiling(x) is the first integer higher than x. Note that Max. IF is approximately ½n 2 . As a higher IF means lower rationality, the discrete rationality factor DRF is calculated as: Here n is number of options available. Based on this the continuous rationality factor CRF Is determined as follows, with Max λi) the maximal value of the different λ i .
CRF =
This method enables to measure to which extent the agent is behaving rationally in a continuous manner. For the given example used to illustrate the previous method CRF= 0.6633. So according to this method the agent is considered to behaving for 66.33% rationally in the given world. Fig. 7 to Fig. 10 show the two types of rationality (depicted as percentages) of the agent for the different scenarios with changing stochastic world. In these figures the first 250 time points show the rationality achieved by the agent just before changing world characteristics drastically for the simulations shown from Fig. 4 . 
Rationality over Time

Discrete
Continuous
From time point 250 onwards, it shows the rationality of the agent after the change has been made (see Fig. 6 ). It is clear from the results (Fig. 7 to Fig. 10 ) that the rationality factor of the agent in all four cases improves over time for the given world.
Discussion
This paper focused on how the extent of rationality of an adaptive decision model can be analysed. In particular, this was explored for variants of a decision model based on valuing of predictions involving feeling states generated in the amygdala; e.g., [1, 2, 6, 8, 14, 15, 17] . The adaptation was based on using four different variations of Hebbian learning; cf. [10, 12] .
To assess the extent of rationality with respect to given world characteristics, two measures were introduced, and using these extents of rationality of the different models over time were analysed. It was shown how by the learning processes indeed a high level of rationality was obtained, and how after a major world change after some delay this rationality level is re-obtained. It turned out that emotion-related valuing of predictions in the amygdala as a basis for adaptive decision making according to Hebbian learning satisfies reasonable rationality measures.
